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Abstract 
Cloud computing is increasingly adopted by both individual and organisational users; 
thus, ensuring the security and privacy of data stored in the cloud is a crucial 
requirement in an organisation‘s business continuity and risk assessment strategies. An 
incident handling strategy is key to mitigating risks to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information assets, particularly those outsourced to the cloud located in 
one or more different countries.  Thus, organisational cloud users may face challenges 
or be limited in their capability to handle security incidents (e.g. security breaches) on 
their sites since the infrastructure on which the data resides belongs to the cloud 
providers.   
Surveys were conducted with industry practitioners to identify:  (1) the implications of 
emerging technologies and its information security threats on the incident handling 
practices, and (2) the factors influencing incident handling adoption for organisational 
cloud users. The results indicated that the current landscape of information security 
threats have impacted on their security strategic planning, resulting in practitioners 
being more proactive, requiring better tactical tools, and cultivating a culture of 
information security. The factors identified as having a significant influence on the 
adoption were determined using an integration of Situational Awareness and Protection 
Motivation Theory. Users are more likely to adopt if they are aware of cloud security 
and privacy related risks, confident in their capability, understand the benefits, and 
understand the impact due to an ineffective strategy.   
The cloud incident handing framework presented in this thesis draws upon principles 
and practices from both incident handling and digital forensics. The integration of 
digital forensic principles and practices facilitates the collection of digital evidence, 
reconstructing of events and establish facts of who, what, when, where, how, and why 
an incident took place. The framework consists of six phases, namely: Preparation 
(integrated with forensic readiness principles); Identification; Assessment (integrated 
with forensic collection and analysis practices); Action and Monitoring; Recovery; and 
Evaluation (integrated with forensic presentation practices). A feasibility study was 
conducted that simulates private cloud storage (i.e. ownCloud) in a virtual environment. 
A security information and event management tool was used to demonstrate that each 
phase is feasible with significant evidence artefacts can be collected.  
 xi 
This framework was also validated using two case studies: mobile cloud storage 
(Google Drive, Dropbox, and OneDrive) and mobile communication (Viber, Telegram, 
Skype, WhatsApp and Messenger) applications. Both studies simulated typical user 
activities on the studied applications on the Android platform.  Mobile forensics and 
network tools were deployed for the collection and analysis of evidence artefacts. The 
first case study simulated uploads, share, read and download files. The artefacts were 
then analysed based on the activities.  The second case study was setting up the scenario 
of terrorists‘ use of mobile communication applications by simulating chat 
conversation, adds contacts, and shared media files activities. The artefacts were 
classified into accounts, contacts, chat logs, shared media files, and location data to 
facilitate terrorism investigations.  
This research has shown that the framework supports organisational users in both the 
incident handling and forensic investigations, as well as informing the design of security 
strategies for organisations.   
 xii 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Research background 
The pervasive interconnectivity of systems (e.g. cloud computing and Internet of 
Things) used in our Internet-connected society can potentially be, and have been, 
exploited by actors with malicious intents, ranging from cyber criminals acting alone to 
organised groups of financially-, criminally- and issue/ideologically-motivated crime 
groups to state-sponsored actors (Choo 2011). It is not surprising that information 
security incidents are increasing in both number and the level of sophistication. For 
example, Symantec Corporation (2016) reported that more than 430 million new types 
of malware were discovered, the number of spear-phishing attacks targeting employees 
increased 55 percent, and crypto-style ransomware grew 35 percent in the fiscal year 
2015. Of note, the report highlighted that security incidents moved to new targets such 
as smart phones, Mac and Linux systems, and cloud computing environments.  
The increasing trend of organisations moving sensitive data to cloud infrastructure has 
resulted in an urgent need to ensure that security and privacy safeguards are in place, as 
cloud services are potential criminal targets due to the amount of sensitive 
organisational data stored in the cloud. As surveyed by the Cloud Security Alliance 
(CSA) (2016), industry experts identified 12 critical issues to cloud security with data 
breaches, poor credential management, and insecure application programming interfaces 
(APIs) being the top three. A proactive incident handling strategy is one key approach 
to mitigating risks to the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of assets, as 
well as minimising loss (e.g. financial, reputational and legal) in a dynamic cloud 
environment. Existing information security incident handling strategies, however, may 
not be adequate as cloud data would generally be virtualised, geographically distributed 
and ephemeral, presenting both technical and jurisdictional challenges. This is 
consistent with CSA‘s report entitled ‗Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in 
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Cloud Computing‘, which highlights three critical focus areas, namely Incident 
Response, Notification and Remediation (Cloud Security Alliance 2011).  
In investigating and responding to computer security incidents, digital forensics can 
play a crucial role (Cichonski et al. 2012; Freiling & Schwittay 2007; Gurkok 2013). 
Forensic tools and techniques are not only useful for criminal prosecution in a court of 
law, but also for various other tasks within an organisation, such as event reconstruction 
(i.e. who, what, when, where, how, and why an incident took place), data or system 
recovery, and system operation troubleshooting (Kent et al. 2006). Similarly, incident 
handling is not only for responding to incidents, but more importantly, identifying the 
root causes to prevent similar breaches from reoccurring. Therefore, incorporating 
forensically sound practices in an incident handling strategy would support cloud 
service users (CSUs) to be better prepared, more proactive, and forensically ready when 
analysing an incident.  
In this thesis, an evidence-based cloud incident handling framework that integrates 
digital forensic practices into incident handling strategies is presented, which is 
designed to allow organisational cloud service users to respond to and investigate 
incidents more effectively.  
1.2 Problem statement 
A successful security incident occurrence or breach can cause direct (e.g. theft of 
intellectual property or customer data) and/or indirect losses (e.g. reputational or legal) 
to organisation assets, and can have significant financial implications. Cloud service 
users (CSUs) and cloud service providers (CSPs) are increasingly at risk of cyber 
incidents, both intentional and unintentional, and by both individuals and organised 
groups (Choo 2010; Hooper, Martini & Choo 2013; Martini & Choo 2012).  
Despite the associated security risks, organisations benefit from migrating to cloud-
based services such as cost-effectiveness, scalability, and flexibility. Hence, engaging a 
strategy to handle security incidents is the key to striking a balance between cost-
effectiveness and security controls. Both CSPs and CSUs may find that ‗traditional‘ 
incident handling procedures are not fit-for-purpose due to the challenges posed by the 
nature of cloud infrastructure such as scope of user control, multi-location and multi-
tenancy (Duncan, Creese & Goldsmith 2015; Juliadotter & Choo 2015; Li, Li & Liu 
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2015; Yang et al. 2015). For example, a security incident of the hacking of Sony‘s 
network in 2011 was attributed to a hacker who rented the Amazon EC2 service 
(Ouedraogo & Mouratidis 2013). Another high profile incident is the iCloud data breach 
that resulted in the dissemination of nude photos and videos of popular celebrities 
(Apple Press Info 2014). The incident has generally affected the reputation of the cloud 
service provider even though Apple‘s investigation revealed that the breach was not a 
result of their system flaws.  
Furthermore, the requirements and challenges of the incident handling principles faced 
by CSUs and CSPs are likely to differ, for example in terms of how and where to collect 
potential evidence and undertake post-incident investigation. Various studies have 
examined the challenges posed by cloud computing (Birk & Wegener 2011; Grobauer 
& Schreck 2010; Martini & Choo 2013; Monfared & Jaatun 2011a, 2011b; Quick & 
Choo 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014; Ruan et al. 2011).When this research commenced in 
mid-2013, there were relatively few academic publications, suggesting that research in 
the area of cloud incident handling is somewhat elusive and still in its infancy.  
1.3 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this research is to design, develop, and validate an evidence-based cloud 
incident handling framework. This study consists of one overarching research question 
and three sub-research questions. The main research question is: How should security 
incidents for organisational cloud users is handled effectively? 
The following sub-questions must be answered in order to address the above main 
question.  
a) What are the impacts of cloud computing infrastructure on incident handling 
strategies (including post-incident investigations)? 
b) Are changes to existing incident handling strategies required to better 
support organisational cloud users, and if so, what changes are required?  
c) How can the proposed cloud incident handling framework be validated? 
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1.4 Research scope 
The focus of this research was narrowed to the development and validation of the cloud 
incident handling framework. The framework is generally involves phases such as 
preparation, detection and analysis, incident response and post incident, which will be 
further discussed in Chapter 4. Technical experiments were conducted in a controlled 
environment such as virtual machine and mobile platform for framework validation.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. The following provides an overview of the 
structure. 
Chapter 2 introduces information security incident handling, and discusses the role of 
digital forensics in incident handling, current research trends, and challenges posed by 
cloud computing to the landscape of incident handling. Subsequently, a high-level 
conceptual cloud incident handling framework is proposed.  
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publication: 
 Ab Rahman, NH & Choo, K-KR 2015, ‗A Survey of Information Security 
Incident Handling in the Cloud‘, Computers & Security, vol. 49, pp. 45–69. 
Chapter 3 presents a study in two parts, undertaken to obtain viewpoints from industry 
practitioners. The first part was conducted to identify the challenges of emerging threats 
to incident handling and digital forensics by utilising Routine Activity Theory. In the 
second part, a conceptual model that draws upon the Situational Awareness Model and 
the Protection Motivation Theory was applied to identify the factors influencing the 
adoption of incident handling in the cloud.  
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publications: 
 Ab Rahman, NH & Choo, K-KR 2015, ‗Factors influencing the adoption of 
cloud incident handling strategy : A preliminary study in Malaysia‘, in 
Proceedings of 21st Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS 
2015). 
 Ab Rahman, NH, Kessler, G, and Choo, K-KR 2016. ‗Implications of emerging 
technologies to incident handling and digital forensic strategies: A routine 
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activity theory‘, in K-KR Choo & A Dehghantanha (eds), Contemporary Digital 
Forensic Investigations of Cloud and Mobile Applications, Syngress, an Imprint 
of Elsevier [In press]. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the feasibility of the framework using an ownCloud (open 
source private Storage as a Service (StaaS) solution) case study simulation. It also 
explains how the Situational Crime Prevention Theory can be used in the framework to 
design mitigation strategies. 
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publication: 
 Ab Rahman, NH & Choo, K-KR 2015, ‗Integrating Digital Forensic Practices in 
Cloud Incident Handling: A Conceptual Cloud Incident Handling Model‘, in R 
Ko & K-KR Choo (eds), Cloud Security Ecosystem, Syngress, an Imprint of 
Elsevier, Waltham, MA, pp. 383–400. 
Chapter 5 validates the framework using mobile cloud storage as a case study. Three 
popular cloud storage applications were deployed, namely Dropbox, Google Drive, and 
OneDrive. The utility of the framework was demonstrated for organisational cloud users 
to undertake incident investigations (e.g. collect and analyse residual data from cloud 
storage applications).  
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publication: 
 Ab Rahman, NH, Cahyani, NDW & Choo, KKR 2016, ‗Cloud incident handling 
and forensic-by-design: cloud storage as a case study‘, Concurrency and 
Computation: Practice and Experience. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3868 
Chapter 6 presents further validation of the framework using mobile communication 
applications as a case study. Five applications were deployed, namely WhatsApp, 
Telegram, Skype, Messenger and Viber. A scenario of the possible use of smart mobile 
technology in terrorism activities was considered. Common user activities were 
simulated to examine the potential evidence artefacts and their association with incident 
handling practices.  
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Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publications: 
 Cahyani, NDW, Ab Rahman, NH, Xu, Z, Glisson, WB and Choo, K-K R 2016, 
‗The role of mobile forensics in terrorism investigations involving the use of 
cloud apps‘, in Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Mobile 
Multimedia Communications (MOBIMEDIA 2016),[In press]. 
 Cahyani, NDW, Ab Rahman, NH, Glisson, WB and Choo, K-K R 2016, ‗The 
role of mobile forensics in terrorism investigations involving the use of cloud 
apps and communication apps‘, Journal of Mobile Networks and Applications, 
[In press]. 
Chapter 7 explores the importance of forensic-by-design (FBD) principles into a 
system or architecture. The concept of FBD is proposed as future work to ensure more 
proactive incident handling activities. Cyber-Physical Cloud System (CPCS) 
infrastructure is used as a discussion to illustrate the concept.  
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publication: 
 Ab Rahman, NH, Glisson, WB, Yang, Y & Choo, K-KR 2016, ‗Forensic-by-
Design Framework for Cyber-Physical Cloud Systems‘, IEEE Cloud 
Computing, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 50–59. 
Chapter 8 presents the key findings and implications of this research, and highlights 
the scope for future research. 
The thesis also includes a number of appendices that contain additional information in 
support of the main discussion, including a sample questionnaire and a sample of 
SQLite database acquisition results.  
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2 Information security incident handling: An 
overview  
This chapter presents an insight into incident handling in the domain of information 
security and cloud computing, commencing by establishing definitions of incident 
management, incident handling, and incident response. It continues by discussing the 
common phases in incident handling and the role of digital forensics in incident 
handling. The next part discusses research trends based on the located materials, and 
follows with challenges posed by cloud computing to the landscape of incident 
handling. Subsequently, a high-level conceptual cloud incident handling framework is 
proposed.  
Material presented in this chapter has appeared in the following publication: 
 Ab Rahman, NH & Choo, K-KR 2015, ‗A Survey of Information Security 
Incident Handling in the Cloud‘, Computers & Security, vol. 49, pp. 45–69. 
 
2.1 Incident handling: A survey 
Information security management is relatively mature, as evidenced by the number of 
international standards and guidelines, as well as the academic literature on the topic. 
Despite the maturity of this area, there is a lack of consistency in describing incident 
management, incident handling, and incident response in the literature. This section 
presents the distinctions between these terminologies, as explained in the remainder of 
this section (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 What is incident management? (Adapted from: Alberts et al. 2004; British 
Standards Institution 2007; Cichonski et al. 2012) 
As explained by Alberts et al. (2004), incident management is not only about 
responding to an incident; it also includes vulnerability handling, artefact handling, 
security awareness training, and other related services.  
Incident handling consists of incident reporting, incident analysis, and incident response 
(Killcrece 2003). Incident response refers to the collective actions taken to resolve or 
mitigate an incident, coordinate and disseminate information, and implement follow-up 
strategies to prevent future similar incidents. Similarly, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) (Cichonski et al. 2012) defines incident handling as 
the whole lifecycle that includes incident response. The latter relates to the ability to 
react to a security incident.  
Grobauer and Schreck (2010) further explain that response should incorporate 
containment, eradication, and recovery phases, which is consistent with the proposed 
guidelines for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) (Alberts et al. 
2004) and NIST (Cichonski et al. 2012). This is the definition adopted in this chapter, 
namely incident management is the ‗big picture‘ (as presented in Figure 1) that 
comprises incident handling and incident response. The grey boxes in the Figure 1 
represent the scope of this study.  
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2.1.1 Standards and guidelines 
This section briefly describes several key international standards and guidelines, and 
our reviews of existing academic incident handling models.  
Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre (CERT/CC): 
CERT/CC, part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), located in Carnegie Mellon 
University (CMU), published a series of four guidelines for managing information 
security incidents. The Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRT) (West-Brown et al. 2003) is the main publication designed to provide specific 
in-depth guidance to support organisations in forming and operating a CSIRT (West-
Brown et al. 2003). The State of the Practice for CSIRTs (Killcrece 2003) is designed to 
assist new and existing teams in understanding best practices and recommendations for 
handling incidents and related CSIRT services. The Organisational Models for CSIRT 
publication (Killcrece et al. 2003) focuses on selecting the right model for an 
organisation‘s incident response capabilities. Defining incident management processes 
for CSIRTs: A work in progress (Alberts et al. 2004) provides an overview of the 
processes and functions, and supporting people, technology, and procedures that are 
involved in incident management.  
CERT/CC discusses four phases of the incident handling process model (i.e. receiving 
an incident report, triage, incident response, and analysing), which consists of 14 sub-
phases.  
NIST Special Publication (NIST SP 800-61): NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency 
within the US Department of Commerce. The Computer Security Division of NIST 
publishes Special Publications in the 800 series for the computer security community. 
SP 800-61 (Cichonski et al. 2012) is one of the 800 series documents that discusses 
computer security handling guidelines.  
This guideline outlines four incident handling phases, namely (1) preparation, (2) 
detection and analysis, (3) containment, eradication, and recovery, and (4) post-incident 
activity. In NIST‘s incident handling model, the second (i.e. detection and analysis) and 
third (i.e. containment, eradication, and recovery) phases are illustrated as iterative, 
whereas the final phase is interconnected to the first phase. 
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This guideline includes a detailed description of each phase, and highlights some key 
points, such as recommendations for conducting incident analysis, incident 
documentation, and the sharing of information between team members and external 
parties. 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): ISO/IEC 27035:2011, an ISO 
information security incident management standard, is designed for large and medium-
sized organisations (ISO 2011). The standard is not limited to incident handling, and 
covers processes for managing information security events and vulnerabilities.  
Five phases are incorporated in the standard, namely (1) planning and preparation, (2) 
detection and reporting, (3) assessment and decision-making, (4) responses, and (5) 
lessons learnt. The phases are depicted as a lifecycle, as each phase is connected to the 
following phase, including the final phase being linked to the first phase. 
This standard also provides a collection of reporting form templates for information 
security events, incidents, and vulnerabilities.  
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA): ENISA is an 
agency of the European Union (EU) that was established to improve network and 
information security in the EU. As an agency of expertise, ENISA is actively 
contributing to specific technical and scientific tasks.  
The Incident Management Guide is one ENISA publication that provides practical 
information and guidelines for the management of incident handling phases (ENISA 
2010). The phases consist of six major sequence components, these being (1) incident 
report, (2) report registration, (3) triage, (4) incident resolution, (5) incident closure, and 
(6) post-analysis. ENISA‘s approach closely follows the CERT/CC approach, except for 
the inclusion of incident closure and post-analysis as the final phase. The guideline also 
incorporates a formal framework for a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), 
such as roles, workflows, and basic CERT policies.  
SANS Institute: The SANS Institute is a well-known private US company that 
specialises in Internet Security training. In addition, the SANS research archive is 
publicly available, and is referred to as the SANS Reading Room. Many publications in 
various computer security areas can be accessed from the Reading Room, including 
those on incident handling matters. 
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The SANS Incident Handler‘s Handbook (Kral 2011) provides information for IT 
professionals and managers to create incident response policies, standards, and teams 
for their organisations. It incorporates six phases as follows, (1) preparation, (2) 
identification, (3) containment, (4) eradication, (5) recovery, and (6) lessons learnt. This 
handbook is quite brief compared to the other five guidelines discussed in this section. 
Its contents include a checklist for the incident handler, and guidelines on anomaly 
searching for Windows and UNIX operating systems. 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL): ITIL is a set of practices for 
IT service management (ITSM) that focuses on aligning IT services with the needs of 
the organisation. The ITIL publication consists of five volumes, and each one covers an 
ITSM lifecycle stage.  
BIP 0107:2008—Foundations of IT Service Management Based on ITIL V3 (British 
Standards Institution 2007)—is a model for IT service management. Incident 
management is one of the service management areas. It consists of five main phases, (1) 
incident detection and recording, (2) classification and initial input, (3) investigation 
and diagnosis, (4) resolution and recovery, and (5) incident disclosure. These five 
phases are described as a process workflow. Event management is another service area 
that is closely related to incident management. It is concerned with monitoring events 
and detecting any triggered events for the incident management process. 
2.1.2 Related works 
A number of academic models or frameworks (both terms are used interchangeably) 
have been proposed by various authors, who discuss key phases and activities involved 
in the incident handling model. 
Mitropoulos et al. (2006) proposed a framework that draws upon principles of digital 
forensics and incident handling and responses. It comprises six phases, namely (1) 
preparation, (2) identification, (3) containment, (4) eradication, (5) recovery and (6) 
follow-up. These phases are in line with the existing standards and recommendations, 
such as SANS (Kral 2011) and NIST (Cichonski et al. 2012). Another more recent 
study (Line 2013), based on the existing ISO/IEC 27035:2011 standard, presented a 
qualitative analysis that investigated current practices concerning information security 
incident management in the power industry. 
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Focusing on small-scale organisations and CSIRT, Kim et al. (2011) proposed a 
systematic approach for comprehensive incident handling that focused on bot response, 
covering detection, analysis, and response phases. The authors noted that the other 
phases of incident handling (i.e. preparation and post-incident) will be expanded on by 
large CSIRTs. The model of Khurana et al. (2009) uses a collaborative incident 
response and investigation mitigation strategy for multiple sites, which comprises four 
parallel phases at two sites (i.e. local and collaborative centre sites). The phase starts 
with incident preparation at both sites. It is followed by incident detection and strategy 
development at the local site, and in the meantime the collaborative centre starts using 
incident analysis once it has received an incident detection report. Both sites then 
conduct their investigations independently and finally close the incident collaboratively. 
The emergence of cloud computing in recent years has led to several researchers 
examining incident handling in the cloud. For example, Grobauer and Schreck (2010) 
analysed the challenges and approaches that would be suitable for incident handling and 
response in the cloud. The challenges and approaches are examined for the following 
five common steps: (1) detection, (2) analysis, (3) containment, (4) eradication and 
recovery, and (5) preparation/continuous improvement. 
Using an OpenStack environment (Infrastructure as a Service—IaaS) as a case study, 
Monfared and Jaatun (2012) demonstrated that the NIST incident handling guideline 
can be adapted for deployment in the cloud computing environment by introducing 
cloud specific strategies in each of the five phases.  
The five key cloud strategies are specific cloud incident handling approaches, 
responsible stakeholder(s) for the approaches, service impacted, enforcement 
challenges, and specific platform and library dependencies.  
A comparative summary of the six standards and guidelines, and the existing academic 
incident handling model is presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. As outlined in 
Table 1, the standards and guidelines of CERT/CC, BIP 0107:2008 and ENISA are 
reactive (i.e. services are triggered by an event or request). Both CERT/CC and ENISA 
incorporate incident preparation as part of the incident management framework, 
whereas BIP 0107:2008 discusses the issue with reference to event management (other 
sub-areas). This is consistent with several other published works (Anuar et al. 2011; 
Yuill et al. 2000), which pointed out that incident handling is primarily reactive. On the 
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other hand, only one academic model is reactive. This particular model, however, 
focuses on small-scale incidents. The remaining standards and guidelines in Table 1, 
and models in Table 2, incorporate proactive elements (i.e. provide assistance and 
information to help prepare, protect, and secure). This is not surprising due to the 
changing trend in information security and the threat landscape, which increasingly 
requires proactive defence and real-time incident response to defend an organisation 
against myriad security issues. 
As mentioned earlier, incident response and incident handling have been used 
interchangeably in the literature. Two studies in Table 2 used the ‗incident response‘ 
terminology to describe incident handling activities, in contrast to previous studies and 
recommendations (Alberts et al. 2004; Cichonski et al. 2012; Grobauer & Schreck 
2010). Despite the use of different terminologies to describe the various phases in the 
standards, guidelines, and academic models, four common main incident handling 
phases are identified in Tables 1 and 2. 
Incident handling generally starts with incident preparation, followed by detection and 
analysis of the (detected) incidents, executing response activities, discussing the 
incident issues in the post-incident phase, and finally implementing improvements for 
future actions. Therefore, the four main phases in incident handling are: (1) preparation, 
(2) detection and analysis, (3) incident response (includes containment, eradication, and 
recovery), and (4) post-incident. It is further proposed that each phase requires different 
degrees of proactiveness, from low (or reactive) to high (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Degree of proactiveness 
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It can be argued that both the preparation and post-incident phases require high degrees 
of proactiveness, as both phases actively incorporate mechanisms to prepare, protect 
and secure an organisation‘s assets. Incident response is mainly reactive, and the 
proactive degree for detection and analysis ranges between low and high.  
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Table 1 Comparative summary of incident handling models in international standards and guidelines 
 
 
 
 Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team 
Coordination 
Centre 
(CERT/CC) 
(2003) 
 
 
BIP 0107:2008 
 
 
ENISA (2010) 
 
 
ISO/IEC 27035:2011 
 
 
SANS (Kral 
2011) 
 
 
NIST SP 800-61 (Cichonski et al. 2012) 
 
 
 
 
Relevant phases 
 
 
  Plan and prepare Preparation Preparation 
Reporting and 
detection 
Incident detection 
and recording 
Incident report 
Registration 
Detection and 
reporting 
Identification Detection and analysis 
Triage Classification and 
initial support 
Triage 
Analysis Investigation and 
diagnosis 
Incident 
response 
Resolution and 
recovery 
Incident 
resolution 
Responses Containment 
Eradication 
Recovery 
Containment, eradication and recovery 
 Incident closure Incident closure 
Post-analysis 
Lessons learnt Lessons learnt Post-incident activity 
Other terms 
used to describe 
incident 
handling 
 Incident 
management  
 Incident management   
Reactive / 
Proactive 
 
Reactive Reactive Reactive Proactive Proactive Proactive 
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Table 2 Comparative summary of academic incident handling models 
 
 
  
Mitropoulos et 
al. (2006) 
 
 
Khurana et al. (2009) 
 
Grobauer and 
Schreck (2010) 
 
 
Kim et al. (2010) 
 
 
Monfared and Jaatun 
(2012) 
 
 
Line (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant phases 
Local site Collaborative centre 
site 
Preparation Local 
preparation  
Collaborative 
preparation 
Preparation  Preparation Plan and prepare 
Identification Detection and 
strategy 
development 
Incident activity 
analysis 
Detection Detection 
analysis 
 
Detection and analysis Detection and 
reporting  
Assessment and 
decision 
Containment Local 
investigation and 
recovery 
Collaborative 
investigation 
Analysis Incident 
response 
Responses 
Eradication 
Recovery Containment, 
eradication, 
recovery 
Containment 
Eradication  
Recovery 
Follow-up Incident closure Incident closure Continuous 
improvement 
 Post-incident activity Lessons learnt 
Other terms used 
to describe 
incident handling 
Incident 
response  
Incident response    Incident 
management 
Reactive / 
Proactive 
Proactive Proactive Proactive Reactive Proactive Proactive 
Standard / 
guideline adoption 
    NIST SP 81-600 ISO/IEC 
27035:2011 
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2.2 The main phases of incident handling 
In this section, the four main phases of incident handling (see Figure 3) are discussed 
based on the objective and its key activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Preparation 
In the preparation phase, the organisation should be in a state of readiness to minimise 
the impacts of security incidents, and maintain business continuity (Taylor 2013). The 
proactive degree in this phase should be high to ensure that unforeseen or black swan 
events (i.e. events due to unexpected and highly unpredictable causes) are prepared for 
well. Information Security (IS) management (e.g. IS culture, training, and policy 
compliance) is one popular approach to pre-incident preparation, which includes 
establishing corporate security policies and regular updates, the incident notification 
process, the development of an incident containment policy, creation of incident 
handling checklists, a staff training program, and ensuring the security risk assessment 
process is functioning and active (Johnson 2014).  
From a technological perspective, it is crucial to address logical security control. This 
includes, for example, firewall implementation, malware protection, vulnerability 
assessment, network monitoring, and data security protection (such as encryption 
systems and authentication systems). An example of recent technology is Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM), which provides real-time monitoring and 
Figure 3 Incident handling phases and research areas (Adapted from: Cichonski et 
al. 2012; Grobauer & Schreck 2010) 
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historical reporting of security events captured by networks, systems, and appliances 
(Anuar et al. 2010). Physical and environmental security complements logical 
protection. Another key backbone in the preparation phase is the establishment of a 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) that is responsible for 
determining what happened, what actions need to be taken, and then undertaking these 
actions. 
2.2.2 Detection and analysis 
Preparation aims to minimise incident risk, yet not all incidents can be prevented. It is, 
therefore, necessary to rapidly detect and analyse an incident occurrence. The degree of 
proactiveness gradually changes from high to medium, based on particular processes. 
The detection phase begins as soon as a suspicious or unusual event is detected and 
reported. Some examples include unfamiliar file names, unexplained new files, 
excessive unsuccessful login attempts, and suspicious entries in the network system 
account. The detection can originate from an automated tool (e.g. intrusion detection 
system) or be manually reported by people (users and employees). To systematically 
organise the flow of reports, an incident reporting model must be established in an 
organisation.  
Incident analysis is then conducted to determine the report‘s validity (probably false 
alarm), and the potential impact(s) on the organisation‘s core services and assets. Risk 
management (including risk assessment, mitigation, and evaluation) is the key to 
estimating the damage that such impacts can have on an organisation. Furthermore, the 
results of risk assessment are needed to determine incident prioritisation if multiple 
incidents occur simultaneously.  
2.2.3 Incident response 
Once an incident has been detected, an effective response reaction must be undertaken. 
As explained by Baskerville et al. (2014), response is generally a quick and effective 
reaction to an event to mitigate its harmful effects. In this phase, the proactive degree is 
low, which suggests that reactive activities are taking place. Containment, eradication, 
and recovery are important actions in the incident response phase (Alberts et al. 2004; 
Cichonski et al. 2012). Some examples of containment and eradication action are 
shutting down the infected system, locking compromised accounts, blocking all 
incoming network traffic, and changing passwords on compromised systems. Research 
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efforts for backup and recovery are emphasised in order to improve performance, 
technique, and utilisation of advanced technologies (e.g. online backup, cloud storage). 
No two crime scenes are alike. Similarly, when responding to security incidents, there is 
no one-size-fits-all approach or strategy. Cichonski et al. (2012), for example, suggest 
the following criteria to assist the formulation of an incident response strategy:  
 potential damage to, and theft of, resources  
 need for evidence preservation  
 service availability (e.g. network connectivity and services provided to external 
parties) 
 time and resources needed to implement the strategy  
 effectiveness of the strategy (e.g. partial or full containment)  
 duration of the solution (e.g. emergency workaround to be removed in four 
hours, temporary workaround to be removed in two weeks, and permanent 
solution).  
Ideally, response selection techniques should align with the particular incident scenario 
so that the incident response process can be rapidly deployed, say using an automated 
tool. One example is the automated intrusion response system (AIRS), which can be 
deployed as a decision-making process where appropriate response options are 
automatically selected to provide immediate responses (as demonstrated in the studies 
of Anuar et al. (2013) and Stakhanova et al. (2007)). Researchers such as Shameli-Sendi 
and Dagenais (2013), and Zonouz et al. (2014) have also demonstrated that AIRS is 
able to reduce significantly the delay between detection time and response time, 
especially in relation to complex and multistage attacks (i.e. significant improvement in 
the incident response rate).  
2.2.4 Post-incident 
The post-incident phase constitutes the final phase after an incident has been resolved. 
The degree of proactiveness is switched to high, as the relevant personnel must take the 
initiative to recognise and reflect on new threats, and improve protection mechanisms. 
Information or results from this phase will be used as feedback to improve incident 
handling. A recently recognised feature of the post-incident phase is transferring 
knowledge or experience for future actions, known as adaptive incident learning, which 
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refers to the ability to change and learn from past experiences (Ahmad, Hadgkiss & 
Ruighaver 2012; Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2011).  
Despite its importance and the impact it makes, adaptive incident learning is not widely 
studied compared to the technical aspects of incident handling (Shedden, Ahmad & 
Ruighaver 2010). It also appears from our literature survey that organisational learning 
theory has been used as the theoretical lens to examine how organisations are able to 
develop knowledge to guide practice behaviour through forms, rules, procedures, and 
strategies. Another approach in knowledge management is ontology, which provides a 
formal specification of machine concepts interpretable to various domains and the 
relationships between them, which is claimed to facilitate effective learning from the 
CSIRT to a wider audience (Ping, Haifeng & Guoqing 2010). 
The post-incident phase is mainly concerned with collecting information from the three 
previous phases for the purpose of learning and improving, and usually takes the form 
of a report (Taylor 2013). It also involves formal reporting to top management and 
recommending improvements to incident handling from technical and managerial 
perspectives. As described by Taylor (2013), a generic information content and template 
study would be useful to help prepare a comprehensive and informative report, 
particularly if the report is to be used by law enforcement agencies or in a court of law. 
Existing practices, however, seldom consider digital forensics despite the 
interconnected processes that exist between incident handling and digital forensics. The 
role of digital forensics in incident handling is discussed in the next section.  
2.3 The role of digital forensics in incident handling 
Digital forensics and incident handling are usually discussed separately, although the 
processes may overlap and are interrelated. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
comprehensive survey on incident handling. For example, a recently published 
systematic review has been conducted by Tøndel et al. (2014), examining whether 
current incident management practice and experience are consistent with the 
ISO/IEC 27035:2011 standard. This review is, however, limited in scope, only 
surveying 15 publications in the context of the ISO/IEC 27035:2011 standard. 
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Digital forensics is a scientific discipline concerned with the collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of digital data connected to a computer security incident (Freiling & 
Schwittay 2007), as well as ‗any crime that involves a digital device capable of storing 
electronic information‘ (Simon & Choo 2014). The discovery and acquisition process 
for digital evidence must be conducted in a manner such that the evidential data 
collected is admissible in a court of law. There are several digital forensics models (see 
Table 3), and one widely used model is that of McKemmish (1999), which comprises 
the following four phases: 
1  Identification—involves identification of an incident from its source(s) and  
 determines its type 
2 Preservation—involves the isolation, securing and preservation of the state of 
evidential data 
3 Analysis—involves determining significance, reconstructing fragments of evidential 
data, and drawing conclusions based upon the evidence found 
4 Presentation of digital evidence—involves the summary of results and conclusions. 
Technological advances have spurred the need for a digital forensics model in specific 
domains. Pili et al. (2010) proposed a network forensics model to deal with data found 
across a network connection. Wu et al. (2013) presented a forensics capability 
architecture with reference to critical infrastructure. The first cloud forensics framework 
was, probably, proposed by Martini and Choo (2012), which was subsequently 
validated using ownCloud (Martini & Choo 2013) and Amazon EC2 (Thethi & Keane 
2014). Another cloud forensics framework was proposed a year later by Quick and 
Choo (2013a), and validated using Dropbox (Quick & Choo 2013b), SkyDrive (Quick 
& Choo 2013a), Google Drive (Quick & Choo 2014) and XtreemFS—a distributed file 
system supporting cloud systems (Martini & Choo 2014a). These two frameworks were 
subsequently merged into one (Quick, Martini & Choo 2014). 
The current focus of incident handling is generally on responding to incident breaches, 
without due consideration to collecting evidence that may provide valuable input to 
current investigations, as well as future prosecution of the offender in a court of law. 
Historically, there has been very little discussion of using evidence collected from the 
investigation of previous incidents to assist with current or other investigations. There is 
an opportunity to apply digital forensics processes to incident handling, and it has been 
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noted by researchers such as Freiling and Schwittay (2007) that both incident handling 
and digital forensics use similar security tools, such as log monitoring and data 
acquisition, in a range of activities. For example, when a system is compromised, digital 
forensics processes, such as those of Valjarevic and Venter (2013), and techniques, such 
as those of Quick and Choo (2013c), can be used to facilitate the collection of evidence 
from compromised cloud servers and client devices for analysis. This would allow 
subsequent reconstruction of the incident and establish facts such as:  
 where the attack came from 
 what vulnerabilities were exploited 
 what data and /or which systems were compromised. 
The evidence collected can be used to inform a risk mitigation strategy as well as be 
used in the prosecution of the offender in a court of law. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that there have been attempts to integrate forensic practices into incident handling or 
vice versa. For example, Pili et al. (2010) and Kohn et al. (2013) integrated the incident 
response phase into their proposed forensic model. Another similarity is the concept of 
forensic readiness, a state of proactive digital forensics that is capable of determining in 
advance what evidence is required when an incident occurs (Pangalos, Ilioudis & 
Pagkalos 2010). There is increased discussion on the importance of being proactive in 
digital forensics investigations, such as forensic readiness, in recent times. 
Conceptually, forensic readiness aligns with the proactive nature of incident handling, 
and seven of the nine models reviewed in Table 3 incorporate the forensic readiness 
phase. Increasingly, digital forensics specialists are found in most CSIRTs (Ruefl et al. 
2014). 
The need to integrate digital forensic science and incident handling has been noted in 
several studies (Cichonski et al. 2012; Freiling & Schwittay 2007; Gurkok 2013), and in 
this chapter, forensic activities (or sub-areas) in each phase of the incident handling 
model are integrated as illustrated in Figure 4. Forensic tools and techniques are not 
only useful for criminal prosecution in a court of law, but also for various other tasks 
within an organisation, such as event reconstruction (i.e. who, what, when, where, how, 
and why an incident took place), data or system recovery, and system operation 
troubleshooting (Kent et al. 2006). 
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For instance, findings from forensic analysis in the detection and analysis phase can 
assist the organisation in identifying key assets and the vulnerabilities and threats that 
could be exploited to target such assets in the organisation. This will subsequently help 
to inform the implementation of suitable risk assessment, security controls, and 
mitigation strategies. An appropriate and effective risk assessment and mitigation 
strategy can also help to ensure that the organisation is forensically ready, and when an 
incident occurs, the investigators responding to the incident know where potential 
digital evidence resides in the organisation‘s systems. This will facilitate a more 
efficient and timely incident response and forensic examination.  
 
Figure 4 The main digital forensics activities in the incident handling 
  
  
  
24 
Table 3 Comparative summary of digital forensic models 
 Cohen (2009) Pilli et al. 
(2010) 
Agarwal et al. 
(2011) 
Martini and 
Choo (2012) 
Wu et al. 
(2013) 
Valjarevic and 
Venter (2013) 
Kohn et al. 
(2013) 
Quick and 
Choo (2013a) 
Quick, Martini and 
Choo (2014) 
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